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Huiting Liu and Qinying He
College of Economics & Management, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou, P.R. China
ABSTRACT
Based on provincial panel data of China ranging from 2004 to
2015, this paper has empirically examined the effect of basic pub-
lic service on the urban–rural income inequality with a system
generalised method of moments (sys-GMM). We arrive at the fol-
lowing conclusions: 1) the improvement of public service provi-
sion is conducive to narrowing the urban–rural income gap; 2)
compared with the ‘hard’ public services (including infrastructure,
environmental protection and cultural facilities), the ‘soft’ public
services (including education, medical care and social security)
play a more significant role in reducing the disparity; 3) the
household registration system impairs the welfare brought by the
‘soft’ public services and exacerbates the passive effect of ‘hard’
public services on the income gap; 4) the interactive impact of
household registration regulation and public service provision on
the income gap is more significant in developed areas. These
findings suggest the government should give priority to the
improvement of ‘soft’ public services, reevaluate the way of
spending on ‘hard’ public services in rural areas and deepen the
household registration system reform.
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In many developing countries, the imbalance between urban areas and rural areas is
a major concern (Kibriya, Bessler, & Price, 2019; Ravallion & Chen, 2007). Such
evidence can be easily found in the issue of urban-rural income inequality, which
contributes mostly to the overall income inequality in developing countries
(Sicular, Ximing, Gustafsson, & Shi, 2007; Young, 2013). It is widely documented that
urban–rural income inequality is closely related to the unequal distribution of basic
public services between urban areas and rural areas.1 Especially, in some countries
like China, due to the household registration or hukou system,2 the rural population
cannot enjoy basic public services as much as urban residents even if they live in cit-
ies (Song, 2014).
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The unequal access to public resources that accompanies the urban-rural income
inequality reduces intergenerational mobility as well as hinders the sustainable growth
of the economy (Bartkowiak, 2017; Corak, 2013; Kibriya et al., 2019). Therefore,
China is paying more attention to improving rural households’ access to public serv-
ices. One example is rural revitalisation, which is one of the major policies that have
been recently made by the Party’s 19th National Congress in China. The proposal of
the rural revitalisation strategy aims to solve the problem of unbalanced development
of the country. Also, early in 2008 after the global economic recession, a four-trillion-
dollar plan was proposed to stimulate domestic demand. The vast rural areas were
regarded as a new engine for economic growth and since then more public resources
have been allocated to them. Meanwhile, the household registration system has been
reformed significantly to allow rural migrants an easier access to welfare programmes
in cities.3 However, effects of the above reforms remain unclear. According to the sta-
tistics published by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, the urban-rural
income gap exceeded 3.3 in three consecutive years between 2007 and 2009.4 Since
then, this ratio had declined regularly, but still reached 2.7 in 2017.
Extensive previous work has focused on the possible causes of the urban-rural
income inequality in China. These studies could be classified into three groups. The
first group studies the impact of political strategies, such as the household registration
system, the urban biased policy and the opening reform (e.g., Demurger, Li, & Yang,
2012; Gravemeyer, Gries, & Xue, 2011; Sicular et al., 2007). The second group studies
individual and household characteristics, such as human capital, health, and family
structure (Solinger, 1999; Young, 2013). The third group studies macro-socioeco-
nomic factors, such as education expansion (Nie & Xing, 2019), social insurance
coverage (He & Sato, 2011), falling labour share (Molero-Simarro, 2017), financial
development (Huang & Zhang, 2019), urbanisation (Qiu & Zhao, 2019; Wang, Shao,
& Li, 2019) and industrial structure (Yang, Nie, Liu, & Shen, 2018).
Our paper relates to the literature on the impact of unequal distribution of public
services on income inequality. Among the basic public services, the influence of dis-
tribution of educational resource is most discussed. For example, Becker and
Chiswick (1966) first revealed that educational differences lead to a large income gap.
Yang and Qiu (2016) show that the difference in early education investment contrib-
utes the most to income gaps in China, and suggest subsidising early education is the
most effective public policy to mitigate income inequality. Zhou and Zhao (2019)
argue that education demonstrates an inverse U-shaped trend in its contribution to
income inequality in China with a counterfactual estimation. Another kind of public
services widely studied in the discussion of income inequality is social insurance
coverage. For example, He and Sato (2011) highlight that the uneven supply levels of
social security between the rural and the urban areas could increase the urban-rural
income gap in China. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) find evidence that the insuffi-
ciency of formal insurance causes misallocation in the labour market, and leads to
the large spatial wage disparities in India. With regard to other aspects, Cohen and
Monaco (2008) find that the improvement of ports and highway infrastructures
causes space spillover effects, and the reallocation of resources among regions. From
an integral perspective, Bartik (1991) points out that the improvement of public
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services could boost economic growth, and then affect income distribution. Aaberge
and Langørgen (2006) indicate that public services help to reduce inequality of long-
term income distribution. Based on the ‘voting by foot’ theory (Tiebout, 1956), some
scholars provide evidence that the uneven distribution of public services exacerbates
income variations, thus enlarging spatial inequality (Banzhaf & Walsh, 2008, 2013;
Sun, Fu, & Zheng, 2017).5
In addition, our paper relates to an increasing number of studies that examine the
relation between the household registration system and the growing income gap.
There is significant evidence that the household registration system plays an import-
ant role in urban-rural income inequality in China (Sicular et al., 2007). Based on a
dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and simulation techniques,
Whalley and Zhang (2007) provide evidence that the removal of the household regis-
tration system could lead to a reduction of urban-rural income inequality. Consistent
works are also produced by Zhang, Yi, Luo, Liu, and Rozelle (2013), Fields and Song
(2019). Further, some studies investigate how the household registration system
affects urban-rural income inequality. The majority of them focus on the labour mar-
ket discrimination caused by the household registration system, including wage dis-
crimination and hiring discrimination (Gravemeyer, Gries, & Xue, 2011; Chen &
Hoy, 2011; Demurger et al., 2012).6
In this paper, we include the two key influential variables, household registration
system and public services provision in the same analysis framework to discuss
urban-rural income inequality. We construct different indexes to reflect the actual
provision of basic public services instead of public spending in the recent decade in
China with an entropy method. In the light of possible interactions among the public
services, we offer an overall evaluation of how the integrated improvement of public
service influences urban-rural income inequality in line with the indexes. We also
divide the public services into two categories according to their relevance to the
household registration system in order to explore the differentiated effects. Moreover,
we examine the impact of public services on urban-rural income inequality under dif-
ferent scenarios to capture their non-linear relationship with a threshold model.
Compared with the majority of studies on household registration regulation, we
contribute to the literature by examining how the interaction of household registration
regulation and public services shapes the urban-rural income inequality theoretically
and empirically. We focus on the pre-market discrimination associated with the
unequal access to public services, which is less analysed, to explain the income gap in
the literature, i.e., people who have different hukou at birth access different public ser-
vice, possibly resulting in the difference in future income outcomes (Afridi, Li, & Ren,
2015; Demurger, Gurgand, Li, & Yue, 2009; Fu & Ren, 2010). We examine the effect
from a macro perspective to capture the influence of governmental intervention, and
try to cover a wider range of public services, not confined to specific aspects.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 proposes the research propos-
ition through theoretical modelling. Section 3 introduces the data set and variables, and
especially uses the entropy method to measure the level of public service in China.
Section 4 empirically tests the effects of public service and household registration regu-
lation on the urban-rural income gap. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
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2. Theoretical model
We start with a brief theoretical model to make propositions on how the basic public
services influence the urban-rural income gap under the household registration sys-
tem. For simplicity, the following assumptions are made: 1) the national economy
only consists of two sectors, namely, the agricultural production sector, located in
rural areas, and the non-agricultural production sector, located in urban areas. The
capital and labour output elasticity coefficients of the two sectors are assumed the
same, while input factors such as capital, labour and technology vary; 2) the initial
labour forces in rural and urban areas are denoted as L1 and L2, and L1 ¼ aL1 þ
bL1 þ cL1 where a, b, c respectively represent the proportion of rural labour engaged
in agricultural production activities in rural areas, migrant workers engaged in non-
agricultural production activities without a residence registration, and those with a
residence registration in urban areas. The total labour force remains constant, and
the production function is in the form of Cobb Douglas.
According to the above assumptions, the intensity of urban household registration
regulation g could be expressed as:
g ¼ bL1ðbþ cÞL1 þ L2 (10)
where g is measured by the ratio of the number of unregistered migrants to the number
of permanent residents in urban areas. A city’s permanent resident population (or de
faco population) reflects the size of the tax base for local government to obtain fiscal rev-
enue. Since local government in China is only responsible for providing public services
for the registered population, the government of a city with an abundant labour force
inclines to restrict the accessibility of urban hukou for ordinary migrant workers, in order
to reduce the financial burden without affecting the city’s economic growth. The greater
the ratio is, the stronger the government’s willingness to regulate migration. Output, tech-
nical levels, and capital inputs of the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector
are defined as Y1 and Y2, A1 and A2, and K1 and K2 respectively. The capital and labour
output elastic coefficients of the two sectors are assumed the same, and are recorded as a
and 1 a. The production functions of the two sectors can be outlined as:
Y1 ¼ A1Ka1 ðaL1Þ1a (2)
Y2 ¼ A2Ka2 ðbþ cÞL1 þ L2½ 1a (3)
The per-capita outputs of the two sectors are:




y2 ¼ Y2ðbþ cÞL1 þ L2 ¼ A2
K2
ðbþ cÞL1 þ L2
 a
(5)
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The per-capita capital inputs of the two departments are given as k1 ¼ K1=aL1 and
k2 ¼ K2=½ bþ cð ÞL1 þ L2]. Under the assumption of market clearing, the rewards for
the labour engaged in agricultural production and non-agricultural production,
respectively, are:
w1 ¼ y1k1y01 ¼ ð1aÞA1ka1 (6)
w2 ¼ y2k2y02 ¼ ð1aÞA2ka2 (7)
Under the urban-rural dual structure of China, the urban registered population
accesses more basic public services than does the non-urban registered population. At
the same time, new public services are mainly concentrated in cities, rather than rural
areas. Therefore, the supply of rural public service could be standardised to 1 and
could be assumed to remain unchanged, while the supply of urban public service is
set to H. Therefore, the levels of per capita public service supply in rural and urban
areas could be expressed as h1 ¼ 1=aL1 and h2 ¼ H=ðcL1 þ L2Þ.
Further, the urban-rural income gap could be defined as p ¼ pw þ ph. We assume
that the urban-rural income gap (p) comes from two aspects, namely, the wage gap
(pw) and the supply gap of public services (ph). The wage gap could be further elabo-
rated as pw ¼ w2=w1, and the supply gap of public services could be illustrated as
ph ¼ h2=h1. Substituting (1), (6), and (7) into the above equations, we obtain:





Þa þ aHð1=g 1Þb (8)
Deriving the above function, we have op=og > 0 and o2p=ogoH > 0. According
to the results of the derivation, the following proposition arises.
Proposition 1. The stricter the household registration regulation, the greater the
income gap between urban and rural areas.
Proposition 2. A s the intensity of household registration regulation increases, the
increase in public service provision would enlarge the urban-rural income gap.
Therefore, we can infer from the above propositions that strict household registra-
tion regulation could worsen the impact of unequal allocation of public services on
the urban-rural income gap.
3. Data and measurements
3.1. Data
The data used in this paper are from the China Statistical Yearbook, the China Labor
Statistics Yearbook, and the China Health and Family Planning Statistical Yearbook
of 2004–2015, published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) (http://
data.stats.gov.cn/index.htm). Our data set started from 2004 because data on public
service provision at a provincial level are only available since 2004. The data covered
the years during the era of household registration reform and supply-side structural
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reform. The sample had a wide regional coverage, including the following provincial
regions: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, Anhui, Shandong,
Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Inner
Mongolia, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Gansu, Yunnan, Heilongjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, and
Guizhou. Due to some key indicators being missing, we excluded samples from the
following regions: Tibet, Chongqing, Hainan, and Xinjiang. The samples from Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan were also excluded, with the consideration of different
statistical calibres in these regions. Finally, our research samples covered 24 provincial
administrative units and three municipalities of China, with 324 observations in
total.7The geographical locations of the sampled regions are indicated in Figure 1.
3.2. Measuring the dependent variable
The dependent variable was the urban-rural income gap, which was measured by the
ratio of the household per-capita disposable income of urban residents to the house-
hold per-capita net income of rural residents. Given striking differences in terms of
income components, income source, consumption structure and social security
between urban and rural households in China, it is not easy to obtain urban and
rural household income that is more comparable (see, Li & Luo, 2010). The income
definition of NBS includes different income components for rural households and
urban households. The net income of rural households includes two major
Figure 1. The average urban-rural income gap of the sampled regions in China.
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components: cash income and in-kind value of home product for self-consumption
after deduction of production cost, while there is no in-kind value in the disposable
income of urban households. Such a difference made the definition of net income for
rural households inconsistent with the definition of disposable income for urban
households. We accepted the definition of the urban-rural income gap adopted by
the NBS as most studies did. The higher the ratio was, the greater the income gap
between urban and rural areas. Moreover, we deflated the value of income by provin-
cial consumer price indices to Yuan as of 1978 with consideration of inflation and
differential price levels among provinces.
As shown in Figure 2, the overall trend of the urban-rural income gap had
declined since 2009. The declining trend could be explained by the large public
investment in rural areas after the global recession of 2008–2009. During the period
from 2004 to 2015, the average gap still reached 2.93. Meanwhile, we could see that
the income disparities differed among the eastern regions, the middle regions, and
the western regions in both Figures 1 and 2.8 The average urban-rural income gap of
western regions remained above the national average level, followed by that of middle
regions. Compared with eastern regions, the economic development of the west and
the middle regions was confined by their limited resources, leading to more focus on
urban development. This could be one explanation of the larger income gap.
3.3. Measuring the explanatory variables
3.3.1. Basic public service provision
The basic public services discussed in this paper covered basic education, medical
care, social security, environmental protection, cultural life, and infrastructure. Before
the empirical test, we needed to assess the performance of basic public services in
each region. Since the efficiency of public spending may differ among regions, we
used the actual provision of basic public services rather than using public spending to
Figure 2. The average urban-rural income gap.
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evaluate their performances. Sixteen indicators were selected to evaluate the above six
subjects. Considering that the influencing mechanisms of different public services
may vary, we also divided the basic public services into two categories according to
their relevance with the household registration. One was ‘soft’ public service provision
only for the registered population, including basic education, medical care, and social
security. The other was the ‘hard’ public service provision, including environmental
protection, cultural life, and infrastructure. The measurement process entailed the fol-
lowing steps: first, we transformed the original data into a dimensionless form, then
we used the entropy method to determine an objective weight for each tertiary indi-
cator with weights summing up to 100%; furthermore, we calculated the overall pub-
lic service index, the ‘soft’ public service index, and the ‘hard’ public service index for
each region in each year, according to the weight of each indicator. Table 1 illustrates
the evaluation system of the indexes.
Figure 3 shows the results of the evaluation. As a whole, the provision of public
services had remained in an upward trend since 2004. However, the supply levels var-
ied among regions. The eastern regions had the best performance, followed by the
middle and western regions. This was plausible in the light of different financial cap-
acity of local governments among regions. It was worth noting that the gaps of public
service provision among regions had shrunk since 2008. It revealed that the central
government had attached more importance to regional balanced development by
increasing public services in the less developed regions since then. The supply level of
‘hard’ public services of the western regions even caught up with that of the eastern
regions after 2011.
3.3.2. Intensity of household registration regulation
We measured the intensity of household registration regulation by the ratio of
unregistered resident population to the resident population (including registered resi-
dents and unregistered residents) in a province.9 Although this is a provincial index,
Table 1. The evaluation index system of basic public services.




Hard or Soft Weight
Basic education Primary school teacher-student ratio 0.04  0.07
Secondary school teacher-student ratio 0.03  0.06
Medical care Number of medical institutions per 10,000 persons 0.07  0.21
Number of health technicians per 10,000 persons 0.05  0.09
Number of beds per 10,000 health institutions 0.04  0.09
Social security Unemployment insurance coverage 0.10  0.18
Pension insurance coverage 0.07  0.15
Medical insurance coverage 0.07  0.16
Infrastructure Number of public toilets per 10,000 persons 0.06 0.12
Road area per capita 0.04 0.08
Number of buses per 10,000 persons 0.05 0.09
Daily water supply capacity per 1000 persons 0.11 0.23
Environmental protection Decontamination rate of refuse 0.04 0.07
Per capital public green space 0.04 0.07
Cultural facilities Number of museums per 10,000 persons 0.08 0.14
Number of libraries per 10,000 persons 0.10 0.19
Note: In the fourth column,  indicates that the item belongs to the ‘soft’ public services while items without  refer
to ‘hard’ public services. The fifth column reveals the index weights for the two categories after classification. The
weight sums up to 100%.
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it reflects the intensity of household registration regulation of urban governments
since most migrants flow into cities rather than rural areas in China. As we men-
tioned in the theoretical section, the local government of a city with an abundant
labour force inclines to place restrictions on the inflow of migrants, in order to pro-
tect the welfare of its registered urban residents. The greater the ratio is, the stronger
the government’s willingness to regulate migration.
3.3.3. Controlled variables
To identify the effects of basic public services, the analyses controlled for the following
factors that may also play a role in the urban-rural income gap, in the light of the rele-
vant literature:
 The gross domestic product per capita was deflated to Yuan as of 1978, with a
logarithmic treatment
 The urbanisation level was measured by the proportion of the urban population to
the total population
 The industrial structure was expressed as the proportion of the tertiary industry’s
added value to the gross domestic product (GDP)
 The proportion of agricultural expenditures was measured by the ratio of the agri-
cultural expenditure to the total financial expenditure
Figure 3. (a) Overall public service index; (b) ‘Soft’ public service index; (c) ‘Hard’ public ser-
vice index.
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 The financial development level was expressed as the ratio of bank loan to
the GDP
 The dependence on foreign trade was expressed as the ratio of import and export
to the GDP
3.4. Descriptive statistics of variables
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics of each variable. It could be inferred that
the regional income disparity is a plain fact in China while it varies from place to
place (also documented in the work of Gao, Liu, Chen, and Cai (2019)), with the
minimum value being 1.85 and the maximum value being 4.76. The average gap was
2.93, indicating the disposable income per capita of urban residents was nearly three
times that of rural residents. It further showed that both the basic public service pro-
visions and the registration regulation intensity were significantly different among
regions. In addition, the descriptive statistical results of the control variables revealed
that these regions varied substantially in urbanisation and economic development.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Econometric methodologies
To address the problems of autocorrelation of the urban-rural income gap, as well as
the potential endogeneity, this paper adopted the system-generalised method of
moments estimation (sys-GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), and
Blundell and Bond (1998) to examine the effect of basic public services on the urban-
rural gap. Since the sys-GMM results showed that multi-level autocorrelations about
the dependent variable may exist, the first-lagged item, second-lagged item, and
third-lagged item of the dependent variable were added to the model. The dynamic
auto-regressive model is specified as follows:
yi, t ¼ a0 þ a1yi, t1 þ a2yi, t2 þ a3yi, t3 þ a4pubi, t1 þ a5idi, t1 þ b0xi, t þ gi, t (9)
where yi, t , yi, t1, yi, t2 and yi, t3 are the urban-rural gaps for region i in years
t, t  1, t  2 and t  3, respectively. pubi, t1 is the public goods provision outcome,
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. Obs.
Urban-rural income gap 2.930 0.590 4.760 1.850 324
Overall public service index 0.310 0.110 0.610 0.080 324
’Soft’ public service index 0.370 0.170 0.800 0.020 324
‘Hard’ public service index 0.270 0.080 0.540 0.130 324
Registration regulation intensity 0.160 0.120 0.650 0.020 324
Gross domestic product per capita 8.760 0.650 10.21 7.010 324
Urbanization level 0.510 0.150 0.900 0.260 324
Industrial structure 0.290 0.070 0.480 0.170 324
Agricultural expenditures 0.088 3.920 0.170 0.012 324
Financial development level 1.120 0.400 2.580 0.540 324
Dependence on foreign trade 0.330 0.380 1.670 0.020 324
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which may be measured by the overall public service index, the ‘soft’ public service
index, or the ‘hard’ public service index for region i in year t  1. The intensity of
household registration regulation for region i in year t  1 is denoted as idi, t1, which
can reflect the dynamic hysteresis, as well as alleviate the endogeneity problem. xi, t is
a vector of control variables including GDP per capita, urbanisation level, industrial
structure, agricultural expenditures, financial development level, and the dependence
on foreign trade.
As mentioned, there exist significant development disparities among different
regions of China. These regions vary greatly in the urban-rural gap, the provision of
public services, the intensity of registration regulation, and economic development.
Therefore, it was of necessity to further examine whether there were non-linear influ-
ences of public service provision under different regulation intensities. Referring to
the threshold effect test proposed by Hansen (1999), a panel threshold regression
model was established:
yi, t ¼ a0 þ a1yi, t1 þ a2pubi, t1  idi, t1ðLnGDP  dÞ
þa3pubi, t1  idi, t1ðLnGDP > dÞ þ b0xi, t þ gi, t (10)
The model treated the logarithm of GDP per capita (LnGDP  d) as the threshold
variable, and the income gap as the dependent variable. The interaction of the public
service provision (which can either be the overall public service index, the ‘soft’ pub-
lic service index, or the ‘hard’ public service index) and regulation intensity was
determined as the core explanatory variable to verify the non-linear influence in dif-
ferent economic development stages.
Before the threshold regression, it was necessary to confirm whether there was a
threshold effect in the model. If it existed, we had to identify the number of thresh-
olds and the corresponding values with a method of bootstrapping. It was verified
that there significantly existed a single threshold, rather than double thresholds or tri-
ple thresholds (the test results for double thresholds and triple thresholds were not
reported due to economy of space). Table 3 reports the results of the single-threshold
test for the model. The F-statistics were all significant at the 1% significance level,
suggesting that a non-linear influence of the key variable may exist.
Table 3. Single threshold test results.
Threshold




















15.17  9.988 11.870 14.177 9.518 (9.468,
9.524)
Note:  denotes a significance level of 1%.
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4.2. The results of the Sys-GMM estimation
Table 4 presents the sys-GMM estimation results for the effect of basic public service
provision on the urban-rural income gap. Column 1 examines the effect of overall
public service provision. The results showed that the improvement of overall public
service provision had a significant positive effect on reducing the income disparity.
With the advancement of the sustainable development strategy, China is paying more
attention to rural development. More public resources have been allocated to the
rural areas. The improved public service provision helps rural residents to increase
their income. Considering that the marginal utility of basic public services is higher
for rural residents (Lall & Lundberg, 2006), it further reduces the income disparity
between the rural and the urban. Column 3 tests the effect of ‘soft’ public service pro-
vision. The coefficient of ‘soft’ public service index in Column 3 was negative and sig-
nificant, suggesting that the improvement of ‘soft’ public service provision plays a
significant role in narrowing the income gap. The improvement of ‘soft’ public ser-
vice provision allows rural residents to attain better education and health condition,
which improves their human capital and future labour market outcomes. Moreover,
it helps to promote their intergenerational social mobility, thus reducing the income
gap. Column 5 examines the influence of ‘hard’ public service provision. The coeffi-
cient of the ‘hard’ public service index was significantly positive, indicating that
increase of ‘hard’ public service provision could enlarge the urban-rural income gap.
One possible reason could be that a substantial proportion of infrastructure is still
concentrated in cities, despite China starting to look at rural development. Also, com-
pared with the direct and concrete benefits from the ‘soft’ public services, the welfare
from ‘hard’ public services is less significant. They seldom make immediate effects on
the income growth of rural residents. Moreover, some infrastructures may just lie
unused or benefit only a certain group of people in the rural areas, leading to no
effect. The coefficients of intensity of registration regulation in columns 1, 3 and 5
also showed that the household registration regulation increases the urban-rural
income gap.
To further understand how the effect of basic public services on income gap is
influenced by the regulation intensity, we introduced an interaction term in columns
2, 4 and 6. The coefficients of the interaction terms in columns 2 and 4 were signifi-
cantly positive, indicating that household registration regulation could impair the wel-
fare brought by the improved public services that narrowed the income gap,
particularly the ‘soft’ public services. At the same time, the significantly positive coef-
ficient of the interaction term in column 6 implied the household registration regula-
tion exacerbated the passive effect of the improved ‘hard’ public service on the
income gap (consider the coefficient of ‘hard’ public service index was positive).
These findings were plausible. In China, household registration regulation is regarded
as a yardstick by urban governments to allocate resources of basic education, health
care, and social insurance. In the regions with high regulation intensity, it is not easy
for rural residents to enjoy the public services in the cities due to strict access to a
city hukou. While the urban residents are the main beneficiaries of public service
improvement, the improvement of public services causes significant difference in wel-
fare for urban residents and rural residents, leading to larger income gap. By contrast,
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in the regions with low regulation intensity, even the cities are allocated with more
public resources; the relaxed registration regulation would allow rural residents an
easy access to a city hukou, which makes the welfare difference between urban resi-
dents and rural residents less significant. Thus, the improvement of public services
benefits both urban residents and rural residents, narrowing the income gap in such
regions. The Hansen test results showed that the selected instrumental variables were
valid. The sequence correlation test results in columns 1–6 indicated that the models
had first-order correlation but they had no second-order correlation. Therefore, the
systematic GMM method was applicable to address the research problem.
4.3. The results of the threshold model estimation
Table 5 demonstrates the regression results for the non-linear influence of interaction
terms on the urban-rural income gap. In regions with LnGDP below the threshold,
the coefficients of interaction terms were negative, though insignificant. It suggested
Table 5. Threshold regression results.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Overall public service index
 regulation intensity (LnGDP  9:5236)
0.028
(0.304)
Overall public service index
 regulation intensity (LnGDP > 9:5236)
0.674 
(0.273)
‘soft’ public service index
 regulation intensity (LnGDP  9:5175)
0.071
(0.228)
‘soft’ public service index
 regulation intensity (LnGDP > 9:5175)
0.499 
(0.197)
‘hard’ public service index
 regulation intensity (LnGDP  9:5236)
0.00771
(0.409)
‘hard’ public service index
 regulation intensity (LnGDP > 9:5236)
0.954
(0.401)
First-lagged urban–rural income gap 0.762 0.764 0.762
(0.0418) (0.0417) (0.0419)
GDP (in log) 0.138 0.131 0.138
(0.0625) (0.0624) (0.0622)
Urbanisation level 0.201 0.196 0.211
(0.342) (0.342) (0.342)
Industrial structure 0.0577 0.108 0.108
(0.501) (0.499) (0.497)
Proportion of agricultural expenditures 0.00321 0.00345 0.00313
(0.00347) (0.00345) (0.00349)
Financial development 0.223 0.221 0.222
(0.0615) (0.0617) (0.0612)
Dependence on foreign trade 0.00153 0.00454 0.00196
(0.0796) (0.0795) (0.0794)
Constant 2.214  2.135  2.204
(0.618) (0.618) (0.613)
R-squared 0.858 0.858 0.857
F-stat 174.6  174.6  174.2
Observations 297 297 297
Note: ,  denote a significance level of 1% and 5%, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in
parentheses.
3218 H. LIU AND Q. HE
that the interactive effect of household registration regulation and basic public service
provision on the income gap is less significant in less developed regions. One possible
reason could be that local governments in less developed areas prefer to attract labour
forces by relaxing restrictions on settlement. The cities in these regions adopt fewer
or no household registration regulations. Also, subject to limited fiscal revenue, the
local governments can afford few public services. The public services for the urban
residents in these areas would not be significantly different from those for rural resi-
dents. This could explain why the coefficient is insignificant. In the regions with an
LnGDP above threshold, the local governments suffer more urban problems that are
caused by overpopulation. They prefer to use the household registration regulation as
a yardstick to allocate public resources. The cities in these regions set up a higher
threshold for migrant workers to achieve a city hukou. Meanwhile, the local govern-
ments possess higher fiscal revenue to afford more and better public services for the
urban areas. Compared with less developed regions, there is a larger difference in
public services for rural residents and urban residents, leading to an increase in the
urban-rural income gap.
In addition, the effects of the control variables on the urban-rural income gap in
Tables 4 and 5 have the same directions with the findings of the existing studies (e.g.,
Huang & Zhang, 2019; Park & Mercado, 2018; Wu & Rao, 2017). Specifically, urban-
isation level, agricultural expenditure and financial development are conductive to
narrowing the income gap. By contrast, industrial structure (measured by the propor-
tion of the tertiary industry’s added value to the gross domestic product) is found to
enlarge the income gap.
5. Conclusions
Based on provincial panel data from the China Statistical Yearbook of 2004–2015,
this paper estimated the effect of basic public service provision on the urban-rural
income gap in China. Before the empirical analysis, we came up with a brief model
to make propositions about the influence mechanism. Then, we divided the basic
public services into two categories of ‘soft’ public services and ‘hard’ public services,
according to their relevance with household registration. Furthermore, we measured
the supply level of basic public services in each region with the entropy method. We
used sys-GMM estimation to address the problem of autocorrelation of the urban-
rural income gap and the potential endogeneity, while verifying the effect of basic
public services. Considering significant development disparity among different regions
of China, we employed a threshold model to estimate the non-linear effect of the
interaction of household registration regulation and public service provision on the
income gap. With the analysis above, we arrived at the following conclusions: first, as
a whole, the improvement of public service provision is conductive to narrowing the
income gap between urban and rural areas. Secondly, compared with the ‘hard’ public
service provision, the ‘soft’ public service provision plays a more significant role in
reducing the disparity. Thirdly, the household registration system impairs the welfare
brought by the improved ‘soft’ public service that narrowed the income gap, and
exacerbates the passive effect of the improved ‘hard’ public service on the income
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gap. Finally, compared with less developed areas, the interactive impact of household
registration regulation and public service provision on the income gap is more signifi-
cant in developed areas.
The results have broad implications for the design of policies. First, the central
government should give priority to the improvement of ‘soft’ public services includ-
ing education, medical care, and social insurance for the rural areas, which was evi-
denced to effectively reduce the income gap. Secondly, the demand from local
residents in rural areas should be fully considered before the large chunk of spending
on ‘hard’ public services for the rural areas. Moreover, it is of great significance to
accelerate the household registration system reform substantially. The household
registration regulation should not be regarded by the local governments as the only
evaluation standard for residents to enjoy local public services. Facilitating the free
flow of labour is an important way to promote equality.
Notes
1. Here, we refer the public services to those services provided by governments to satisfy
residents’ basic requirements for living and producing, including national defence, legal
systems, infrasturature (e.g., road, water, electricity and transportation), social security
(e.g., education, social security, medical care, and technology) and so on.
2. The central government introduced the household registration system in 1958. Since then,
all Chinese citizens have been classified as holding either rural hukou or urban hukou
status according to the person’s official and only ‘permanent‘ residence (Chan, 2009). The
original hukou status is determined by a person’s place of birth and is mainly passed on
by one’s parent(s). This system was initially designed to control population movement.
Nowadays, the household registration system has lost its significance on strictly
prohibiting rural labourers from migrating into urban areas (Chan, 2013). However, it is
related with the access to many public welfares, which still makes it a unique labour
market intervention in China.
3. One breakthrough is to remove the distinction between agricultural hukou and non-
agricultural hukou in some provinces, such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Hebei
and Jiangsu.
4. The urban-rural income ratio is measured by the ratio of the household-per-capita
disposable income of urban residents to the household-per-capita net income of
rural residents.
5. ‘Voting by foot‘ theory implies that people voluntarily move to the regions where the
combination of public services and tax best suits their preferences. Regions with better
public services attract more high-income households.
6. Arrow, (1973) defines labor market discrimination as the valuation of personal
characteristics of the worker that are unrelated to worker productivity in the market place.
7. The three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) are under the direct
administration of central government, ranked as province and part of the first tier
administrative divisions of China.
8. We devide the three regions based on the Eleventh Five-Year Plan proposed by the central
government (2012–2017). The eastern regions include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning,
Shandong, Jiangsu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. The middle
regions include Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, and Inner Mongolia.
The western regions include Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi,
Gansu, and Ningxia.
9. According to the definition by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, we refer
‘registered residents‘ to residents with a local hukou and ‘unregistered residents‘ to
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residents who have resided in the locations at the time of census more than six months
without a local hukou. Both the population of registered residents and unregistered
residents are available from the provincial Statistical Yearbooks. The yearbook data are
derived from the annual 0.1% population sample survey (1% population sample in 2005,
2010 and 2015) conducted by NBS. Therefore, our data source covers not only registered
residents but also unregistered residents (see, Chan &Wang, 2008).
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